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Abstract-Password based authentication with smart cards has 
been adopted as a more secure means in insecure networks to 
validate the legitimacy of users. Traditional authentication 
schemes are based on the tamper-resistant smart card; that is, 
the data stored in the smart card cannot be revealed. However, it 
is a challenging problem for considering non-tamper-resistant 
smart cards used in user authentication. Very recently, in 2010, 
Song proposed an efficient authentication scheme with such non­
tamper resistant smart cards based on symmetric key crypto­
systems as well as modular exponentiations. In this paper, we will 
show that Song's scheme is vulnerable to the offline password 
guessing attack and the insider attack. Besides, this scheme does 
not provide perfect forward secrecy and does not preserve user 
anonymity. 
Keywords-network security; password based authentication; 
smart card 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over insecure networks, it has been a common approach to 
authenticate users with passwords. In 1981, Lamport [1] 
proposed a one-time password remote authentication scheme 
using hash chains, and later, in 1994, Haller [2] presented a 
practical SIKEY one-time password system. However, these 
two schemes need to maintain a verification table in the remote 
server to verify user's legitimacy. Thus, such methods are 
vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack and the modification 
attack on the verification table. 
The smart card is an emerging technology. It consists of a 
microprocessor and memory (RAM and ROM) so that it can 
perform arithmetic/logic operations and store some user 
information. Thus, it has been widely applied to enhance 
remote user authentication, as in [3-18]. In a typical smart card 
based password authentication scheme, a remote server only 
needs to maintain a common secret key, instead of storing a 
verification table to avoid the above drawbacks. 
The evolution of smart card based authentication schemes 
consists of the following security features: 
• no verification table required, 
• letting users choose their own passwords, 
• supporting mutual authentication, 
• providing session keys for secure communications, 
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• providing perfect forward secrecy for session keys even if 
users' passwords are compromised, 
• protecting user anonymity to preserve user privacy, 
• should be efficient and practical, and 
• withstanding various kinds of attacks, such as replay 
attack, offline password guessing attack, user 
impersonation attack, server spoofing attack, man-in-the­
middle attack, and so on. 
Note that the above security features provided by the 
authentication schemes [3-10] are based on the assumption that 
the smart card is tamper-resistant. However, Kocher et al. [19] 
and Messerges et al. [20] pointed out that the stored 
information in the smart card can be obtained through 
monitoring the power consumption or by analyzing the leaked 
information. Therefore, the smart card is no longer a tamper­
resistant device, and, thus, those schemes based on the tamper­
resistant assumption become insecure if the smart card is 
compromised. For example, as reported in [17], Lee-Chiu's 
scheme [7] is vulnerable to the user impersonation attack and 
Lee-Kim-Yoo's scheme [8] is subject to the offline password 
guessing attack if the data stored in the smart card can be 
revealed. 
Therefore, it is a challenge to design a more secure 
password based authentication with non-tamper-resistant smart 
cards. To cope with the information leakage problem with such 
non-tamper-resistant smart cards, several advanced 
authentication schemes [11-18] have been proposed. Recently, 
Xu et al. [17] presented a password authentication scheme 
using such non-tamper-resistant smart cards based on costly 
modular exponentiations. However, Song [18] demonstrated 
that Xu et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the user impersonation 
attack and proposed a new and more efficient authentication 
scheme based on symmetric-key cryptosystems and modular 
exponentiations. 
In this paper, we will show that Songs scheme is vulnerable 
to the offline password guessing attack and the insider attack. 
In addition, this scheme does not provide perfect forward 
secrecy for session keys. Besides, it does not protect user 
anonymity to preserve user privacy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we briefly review Songs smart card based password 
authentication protocol. In Section 3, we demonstrate the 
security weaknesses of Songs scheme. We conclude this paper 
in the last section. 
II. REvIEW OF SONG'S AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
In this section, we briefly review Songs scheme [18], as 
depicted in Fig. 1. This scheme is based on a hybrid approach 
using both symmetric key cryptosystems and modular 
exponentiations. It consists of five phases: initial phase, 
registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and 
password change phase. The notation used in this paper is 
listed below. 
• U :  a user (client) 
• ID : the identity of U 
• PW : the password of U 
• S : a remote server 
• X: the secret key of S 
• h( · ) : a secure one-way hash function 
• EKCM): symmetric encryption of message Mwith secret 
keyK 
• DKCM): symmetric decryption of message Mwith secret 
keyK 
• EB: the bitwise XOR operation 
• II : the concatenation operation 
A. Initial Phase 
The remote server S first chooses a secret key x and two 
large primes p and q such that p = 2q + 1. Then, S selects a 
secure one-way hash function h( ·) and a symmetric key 
cryptography algorithm with encryption EO and decryption 
DO operations, such as DES and AES. The server S keeps x, p, 
and q secret. 
B. Registration Phase 
A user U submits hislher ID and PW to a remote server S 
through a secure channel for registration. If S accepts U's 
registration request, it computes B = h(Iif mod p) EB h(PW) . 
Then, S issues U a smart card containing {lD, B, hO, E( -)} 
over a secure channel. 
C. Login Phase 
If U wants to login to S, he/she inserts hislher smart card 
into a card reader and inputs his/her ID and pw. The smart 
card first generates a random number R. Then, it computes K = 
B EB h(PW), W =  EKCR EB Tu), and Cu = h(Tu II R II W II lD), 
where T u is the current timestamp. Finally, the smart card 
sends the login request message {ID, Cu, W, T u} to S .  
D. Authentication Phase 
1) User Authentication: Upon receiving the login request 
from user U at time T; the server S first validates the user's 
identity ID and checks whether (T'- Tu):S "'-T, where "'-T is a 
predefined transmission delay. If either one fails, the login 
request is rejected. The server S then computes K = h(Iif mod 
p) and R'= DKCw) EB Tu, and checks whether h(Tu II R' II W II 
ID) = Cu. If they are equal, the user U is authenticated, and the 
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sever S accepts the login request; otherwise, reject the request. 
Finally, S computes Cs = h(lD II R' II Ts) and sends the reply 
message {ID, Cs, Ts} to U, where Ts is the current timestamp. 
2) Server Authentication: After receiving the reply message 
from S, the smart card first validates ID and checks the 
freshness of Ts. Then, it checks whether h(ID II R II Ts) = Cs. If 
they are equal, the server is authenticated; otherwise, stop the 
connection. 
3) Session Key Establishment: After successful mutual 
authentication, both U and S compute the shared session key sk 
= h(ID II Ts II Tu II R) for subsequent secure communications. 
E. Password Change Phase 
If the user U wants to change hislher password, he/she 
inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and inputs hislher 
ID and pw. Then, a mutual authentication between the server S 
and the smart card is performed first. Once the authentication is 
complete, the smart card first asks U to enter a new password 
PW� Then, it computes B'= B EB h(PW) EB h(PW') and replaces 
B with B' to complete the password change phase. 
III. WEAKNESS OF SONG'S PROTOCOL 
In this section, we will show that Song's scheme [18] is 
vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack and the 
insider attack. In addition, the scheme does not provide perfect 
forward secrecy for session keys. Besides, it does not preserve 
user anonymity and, thus, is subject to tracking. 
A. OjJline Password Guessing Attack 
A remote user authentication scheme vulnerable to the 
offline password guessing attack must satisfY the two 
conditions: the user's password is weak, and there exists a 
piece of password-related information used as a comparison 
target for password guessing. In Song's scheme, a user U is 
allowed to choose his/her own password at will during the 
registration phase. In general, the user tends to select a 
password that is easily to remember for his/her convenience. 
Hence, such easy-to-remember passwords (also called weak 
passwords) are potentially vulnerable to the offline password 
guessing attack, in which an adversary may try to guess the 
user's password from a dictionary of all possible weak 
passwords and then verifY the guess. 
On the other hand, Song's scheme assumes that the smart 
card is non-tamper-resistant (i.e., the information stored in the 
smart card can be revealed). If an adversary has retrieved B 
stored in U's smart card and has intercepted the messages 
transmitted between U and S in one of previous sessions, such 
as {ID, Cu, W, Tu} and {ID, Cs, Ts}, then the adversary can 
mount an offline password guessing attack as follows. He first 
guesses a new password PW* and computes K* = B EB h(PW*). 
Then, the adversary calculates R* = DK*(W) EB Tu and checks 
whether h(Tu II R
* 
II W II lD) = Cu (or h(lD II R
* 
II Ts) = Cs). If 
they are equal, the guessed password PW* is correct; otherwise, 
continues another guess until the correct password is found or 
run out of the weak password dictionary. 
User Sever 
I Registration I 
Choose ID, PW {JD, P W} 
Compute 
Smart card 
B = h(IIY modp) EEl h(PW) 
Store {JD, B, hO, EO} in a 
smart card 
I Login and Authentication I 
InputJD,PW 
Generate a random number R 
Acquire current timestamp T u 
Compute 
K= B EEl h(PW) 
W =EJd.R EEl Tu) 
Cu=h(TuIIR II W IIJD) {JD, Cu, W, T u} )0 ValidateJD 
Verify freshness of T u 
Compute 
K= h(IIY modp) 
R '=DJd.W) EEl Tu 
Verify if 
ValidateID {JD, Cs, Ts} 
h(Tu II R ' II W II JD) =? Cu 
Acquire current timestamp Ts 
Compute 
Cs = h(JD II R ' II Ts) 
Verify freshness of Ts 
Check if 
h(JD II R II Ts) =? Cs 
Compute session key 
sk = h(JD II Ts II Tu II R) 
Compute session key 
sk = h(JD II Ts II Tu II R ') 
Figure I. Song's authentication protocol 
B. Insider Attack 
It is a common practice in the real world that many users 
use the same passwords to access different servers for their 
convenience without remembering different passwords for 
different servers. However, if a privileged insider (such as the 
system manager) of the server S knows the password of a user 
U, he may try to impersonate U by accessing other servers 
where U has registered. In Song's scheme, U sends hislher ID 
and PW in plaintext form to S during the registration phase. 
Thus, this scheme may suffer from the insider attack [5] if a 
privileged insider comes to know the password PW of a 
registered user U and misuses it. 
C. Lack of Perfect Forward Secrecy 
Perfect forward secrecy is an important security property 
for session key distribution; it means that if a long-term secret 
(e.g., a user's password in a password based authentication 
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protocol) is compromised, the session keys of past sessions still 
cannot be derived. In Song's scheme, once U's password PW is 
compromised, session keys used in previous sessions will be 
computed as follows. Suppose that an adversary has retrieved B 
stored in U's smart card and has intercepted messages {ID, Cu, 
W, Tu} and {ID, Cs, Ts} transmitted in a previous session, then 
the adversary can derive the session key used in that session by 
computing K = B EEl h(PW) and R = DJd.W) EEl Tu. Finally, the 
adversary can obtain the session key by computing sk = h(ID II 
Ts II Tu II R). 
D. Not preserving user anonymity 
Recently, preserving user anonymity has become an 
important issue since it can prevent users from tracking. 
However, in Song's scheme, it does not preserve user 
anonymity because the user's identity ID is transmitted over 
the network in plaintext form. Hence, in this scheme, the user 
anonymity is not preserved and is vulnerable to tracking. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Song's smart card 
based password authentication scheme is vulnerable to the 
offline password guessing attack and the insider attack. 
Besides, it cannot protect user anonymity to preserve user 
privacy such that users can be tracked. In addition, it does not 
provide perfect forward secrecy for session keys such that all 
previous communications can be decrypted with session keys if 
passwords are compromised. 
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